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ESSAYS
MOLECULAR MOTIONS: THE HOLMESIAN JUDGE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE
THOMAS C. GREY*
Oliver Wendell Holmes was perhaps our most famous judge,
and his view of the judicial role is still influential in our law
today, two-thirds of a century after he decided his last case. For
example, Holmes was invoked as a kind of model judge throughout the confirmation proceedings for the two most recent Supreme Court nominees.' So how did he think judges should go
* Nelson Bowman Sweitzer and Mane B. Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School. This is a revised version of the Cutler Lecture, delivered at MarshallWythe School of Law at the College of William and Mary on April 7, 1994. My
thanks, for editorial comments, to Barbara Babcock, Gerald Gunther, and Richard
Posner to students and faculty at a University of Michigan Law School Legal Theory Workshop; to colleagues at a Stanford Faculty Works-rn-Progress Seninar; and,
for research help, to Chris Harms.
1. See, e.g., Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (testimony of Judge Ginsburg) (pledging to "continue
to try to follow the model Justice Holmes set in holding that duty [to resist reading
personal convictions into the Constitution] sacred"); zd. at 312 (testimony of Judge
Ginsburg) (noting the centrality of Holmes's First Amendment opinions to Supreme
Court jurisprudence); Testimony July 12, 1994 Edward M. Kennedy Senator Senate
Judiciary Supreme Court Nomination S. Breyer, Federal Document Clearing House,
July 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (invoking Holmes to
praise Judge Breyer as having shown that "the pursuit of justice can be a great
calling"); Testimony July 15, 1994 Kathleen M. Sullivan Professor Stanford University Law School Senate Judiciary Supreme Court Nomination, Federal Document
Clearing House, July 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File
(analyzing Judge Breyer as a Holmesian judicial pragmatist); Transcript of
President's Announcement and Judge Ginsburg's Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
1993, at A24 (statement of Judge Ginsburg) (referring to "the enduring influence of
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about deciding cases? On this central question, despite all the
attention he has received, I do not think his ideas and practices
have been well understood.
This is not because of any shortage of evidence. Holmes
served as an appellate judge for almost fifty years, twenty on
one of the most important state supreme courts in the country,
and twenty-nine on the U.S. Supreme Court. He wrote well over
two thousand opinions (has any American judge written more?),
and, in the age before law clerk ghost writers, wrote every one of
them himself, in his inimitable, often cryptic, style. There must
have been few issues in the state or federal law of Holmes's judicial half-century that he did not rule on at least once.
In addition, he left us a celebrated body of extrajudicial wntings. Before he became a judge, he had written a classic of legal
theory, The Common Law,' which began with the mantra that
the life of the law had not been logic but experience, and went
on to develop doctrinal ideas that first-year law students still
confront: the objective theory of negligence, and the option theory of contracts. Later, after he had been a judge for many
years, Holmes looked at the law from the perspective of the Bad
Man and came up with his famous prediction theory- "The
prophesies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law " And he left behind
many other speeches and essays that touched on his ideas about
judging. We also have available the hundreds of letters he wrote
on legal subjects to friends and fellow legal insiders, which allow
us to compare his candid personal views with his public utterances. Finally, we have more than a century of commentary on
his judicial performance and his jurisprudence, some of it by
scholars who have simply tried to understand what he said,
much of it by the creative movers of later legal thought, so many
of whom have used Holmes as their springboard or their foil.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes").
2. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963) (n.p.
1881) [heremafter HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW].

3. Id. at 5.
4.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS

167, 173 (1920) [hereinafter HOLMES, The Path of the Law] (originally appearing at
10 HARV. L. REV 457 (1897)).
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If we turn to the commentators for some initial sense of the
main outlines of Holmes's ideas, we can see why he still attracts
interpretive debate. The extensive paper trail he left behind is
really no trail, but a confusing (if inviting) expanse of open terntory While it has been explored by many experienced travelers
over many years, their maps do not yet agree on even the basic
features of the terrain. In his general philosophy, was Holmes a
scientific rationalist, a romantic, a pragmatist, or an early existentialist? In politics, was he a liberal Progressive or a reactionary Social Darwnst? In social theory, was he an individualist or
a collectivist? In legal theory, was he a utilitarian positivist or a
common-law historicist? The evidence gives plausible support to
all of these interpretations. There is similar room for debate
about my topic today, Holmes's judicial philosophy To simplify
matters, let me narrow that debate to a single issue: was he a
strict backward-looking formalist, or a flexible forward-looking
pragmatist?
The legal formalist believes that the office of a judge is to
apply preexisting law to facts. Judges can and must find existing
law that will decide cases in a determinate way The legislator
alone is authorized to make new law based on policy and anticipated consequences. Inevitably personal and partial judicial
opimons about policy and fairness have no proper place in the
decisional process if the Rule of Law is to be respected. This has
been the orthodox jurisprudence of the bench and the bar, at
least until recent tunes.
Legal pragmatism, which has bid to replace formalism as the
conventional legal wisdom in this century, is more complex. The
pragmatist treats legal thought as practical in two senses.
Lawyers' and judges' deliberations are instrumental-meant to
guide action and produce good results. As such, they should be
judged by how successfully their judgments promote the welfare
of those to whom they apply At the same time, for the pragmatist, legal thought is contextual. A legal actor is embedded in the
complexity of actual social practices: for the lawyer, the practice
of law and, for the judge, the practice of adjudication. These
practices have a life of their own and are not ultimately subject
to any clear-cut or simple theory of the nature of law, of justice,
or of social welfare.
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This does not negate the practical importance of theory to law
For the pragmatist, the relation between practice and theory is
dialectical. Lawyers and judges, like people generally, must
often live and- act without reference to any explicit theories. But
customary ways of doing things often run people into trouble. In
problematic situations, human beings sometimes can overcome
their practical difficulties by stepping back from their habits and
engaging in reflective deliberation and self-critical generalization. Theories are attempts to regularize methods of critical
deliberation and systematize the results. But theories derived in
this way must be checked back against practice to test their
power to resolve problematic situations.
A legal pragmatist might say that judges are the socially
designated experts in resolving those problematic situations that
are thought to justify the use of state power. Law, at least in
one aspect, is the more or less systematic body of authoritative
generalizations made or enacted for the purposes of channelling
and coordinating conduct and settling or avoiding disputes.
Since these generalizations are guidelines for action rather than
axioms, judges sometimes make law rather than find it, and in
doing so they should take account of the forward-lookmg criterion of social welfare. The contextual side of pragmatism reminds
us that what will seem a problem, and what will be judged an
advance in social welfare, cannot be fully settled by any a priori
theory
The pragmatist also takes forward-looking account of the virtues of backward-looking rule following, to enhance coordination
and avoid frustrated expectations. The normal pragmatist judicial tendency is to "balance" against each other the factors supporting, respectively, the traditionally judicial formal virtues
and the legislative search for the better rule. Thus Benjamin
Cardozo and Richard Posner, judges of different politics and different times, have both argued for pragmatism in legal theory,
and have both been middle-of-the-road balancers of stable law
against forward-looking public policy 5 Though few judges are

5. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921);
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990) [hereinafter POSNER,
PROBLEMS]; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 27
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self-conscious legal theorists like Cardozo and Posner, many of
the most respected American judges of this century have followed the same general apprQach to judicial office.
Holmes was the most important founder of American legal
pragmatism, and thus it seemed natural when, during the confirmations of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, his authority was
invoked on behalf of the kind of moderate judicial pragmatism
that they preach and practice.6 But-this is the point I want to
make today-unlike them, unlike Judge Posner, and unlike the
prototype of judicial pragmatists, Cardozo, Holmes was by no
means middle-of-the-road in his judicial philosophy, but unique
and in certain respects quite strange. Before I describe the odd
features of his approach to judging, I should say something
about my view that, despite his oddities, he was nevertheless a
pragmatist, the first great American legal pragmatist.!
As I understand legal pragmatism, it is the theory that combines an instrumental with a contextual view of law And it was
Holmes who first (or at least most quotably) articulated both the
instrumental and the contextual sides of American legal
thought. To take the instrumental aspect first, he wrote in The
Common Law that "what the courts declare to have always been
the law is in fact new" and based on "considerations of what is
expedient for the community concerned."' He proposed that
"judges as well as others should openly discuss the legislative
principles upon which their decisions must always rest in the
end, and should base their judgments upon broad considerations
of policy ,, Thus he criticized those of his judicial contemporaries who presented what were necessarily policy choices "as hollow deductions from empty general propositions."'" Famously,
he wrote that, in the doubtful case, the judge is called upon "to
(1990) (describing Cardozo's judicial method as one of measuring the rules of the
common law against the demands of social welfare and legal stability).
6. See supra note 1.
7. For a fuller version of what follows, see Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal
Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989).
s. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 31-32.
9. Id. at 64.
10. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS, supra note 4, at 117, 120 [hereinafter HOLMES, Privilege] (originally appearing at 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894)).
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exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice."" Thus we have
Holmes the instrumentalist, who thought that judges must
make law on the basis of policy and that they should do so explicitly But that is only half of pragmatism. Holmes was also a
contextualist, someone who believed that theory could not rule
over practice but must live alongside it.
You might not see this if you pay too much attention to some
of his more ambitious programmatic statements about reducing
law to a policy science. Thus Holmes once said that "Iflor the
rational study of law
the man of the future is the man of
statistics and the master of economics."' 2 A "true science of the
law" would have at its center "the establishment of its postulates from within upon accurately measured social desires instead of tradition."" To him, it was "revolting to have no better
reason for a law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV " 4
Taken by themselves, these statements suggest that Holmes
wanted to dispense with custom, tradition, and precedent and to
promote an aggressive campaign of utilitarian law reform
through judicial activism-indeed some commentators have so
taken them. But the statements cannot be taken by themselves.
Holmes's gift for vivid epigrammatic statement often leads to the
misinterpretation of his thought. In his thinking he was
dialectical and eclectic, a theorist who always tended to see life
and law in terms of continuing struggles between opposed tendencies, neither of which could, or should, be eliminated. At the
same time, his literary inclination was to dramatize these struggles between ideas by boldly asserting both sides. His memorable phrasing often misleads readers into interpreting as
Holmes's definitive theory a position he was really putting 'forward as at most half of the story Holmes shows his true literary
and philosophical colors at once when he brings two incompatible absolutes together to form a paradox, as with the epigram he

11. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 4, at 210, 239 [hereinafter HOLMES, Law in Science]

(onginally appearing at 12 HARV. L. REV 443 (1899)).
12. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, supra note 4, at 187
13. HOLMES, Law in Science, supra note 11, at 225-26.
14. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, supra note 4, at 187
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often repeated in his letters that "the chief end of man is to
frame general ideas-and that no general idea is worth a
straw "'

Holmes's striking reformist proclamations in favor of an allembracing policy science must be qualified by the equally forceful statements in which he expressed his belief in the impossibility of subduing practice, custom, and tradition to articulate theory Thus in the famous paragraph from The Common Law on
the primacy of experience over logic, he included under the concept of experience a large tacit and contextual component---"the
felt necessities of the tnes
intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow men."' Judicial legislating, he said, had been
largely "the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and
inarticulate convictions." 7
He did want to make judges more aware of this unconscious
side of their enterprise, but not because he had any illusions
that all could be made conscious and explicit. He believed that
"the worth of the competing social ends
cannot be reduced to
number and accurately fixed."" For him, the only index of social utility available to the practical lawmaker-and a very imperfect one-was "the de facto will of the community ""
In short, Holmes believed that the conflicting policies on
which issues of public policy turned were generally incommensu15. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Moms R. Cohen (Apr. 12, 1915), in
LEONORA C. ROSENFIELD, PORTRAIT OF A PHILOSOPHER: MORRIS R. COHEN IN LIFE
AND LETTERS 314 (1962); cf. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 118 (Mark D. Howe ed.,
1941) ("M[The chief end of man is to frame [general propositions] and
no general
proposition is worth a damn."); 2 id.at 13 ("I always say the cluef end of man is to
form general propositions-adding that no general proposition is worth a damn.").
"There is nothing like a paradox to take the scum off your mind." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Lasi (Dec. 22, 1921), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS
389 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953).
16. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 5.
17. Id. at 32.
18. HOLMES, Law in Science, supra note 11, at 231; see HOLMES, The Path of the
Law, supra note 4, at 181 (stating that judges rule as they do "because of some
attitude
upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement, and
therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions").
19. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Holdsworth's English Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS, supra note 4, at 285, 288 [hereinafter HOLMES, Holdsworths] (originally appearing at 25 L.Q. REV. 412 (1909)).
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rable. The contextual side of his pragmatism supported what he
called his "unconvinced conservatism."2 As he once wrote privately to a friend, "I don't believe much in anything that is,.but
I believe a damned sight less in anything that isn't."2' 1 Judge
Posner was right when he described Holmes as only a "tame
utilitarian" yet a "militant skeptic."2 2
Holmes's militant skepticism, it is important to understand,
did not keep him from holding strong views on issues of public
policy, as any reader of his letters knows.' What he was skeptical about was the power of reason and argument to change
strongly held views.24 He described his own convictions as his
"Can't Helps," and he readily recogmzed that other rational and
intelligent people held opposed views quite as forcefully ' The
pragmatic problem of politics for him was to allow for reasonably
civilized common life given strong and enduring disagreement-hence his insistence that a constitution "is made for people of fundamentally different views."2 6
Holmes's blend of militant skepticism and tame utilitariamsm
shaped his attitude toward judging. And the working judicial
philosophy that emerged looked in many respects like orthodox

20. Id. at 289.
21. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Henry Wigmore (Dec. 4, 1910),
quoted in MARK D. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS
198 (1963).
22. POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 241.
23. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Lash (Sept. 15,
1916), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 15, at 19 ("The claims of the Interstate Commerce Commission in ICC v. Harriman, 211 U.S. 407, [to broad powers of
investigation for legislative purposes] made my blood and [sic] boil and it made my
heart sick to think that they excited no general revolt."); Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Aug. 6, 1917), in id. at 72 ("I never read a socialist yet
from Karl Marx down, and I have read a number, that I didn't think talked
drool.
Some essays by the great Webb in Fabian days I thought were slobber, if
that is worse than drool.").
24. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra
note 4, at 310, 310-11 [hereinafter HOLMES, Natural Law] (originally appearing at 32
HARV. L. REV 40 (1918)).
25. Id. at 311.
26. Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes,J., dissenting). Yosal
Rogat failed to make the distinction I urge here in his influential and otherwise
illuminating study of Holmes. Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CI. L.
REV 213, 250-54 (1964).
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formalism. Holmes's actual judicial practice was marked by two
unusually strong tendencies: adherence to judicial precedent and
deference to legislative judgment. In his common-law decisions,
the author of The Common Law was generally not an innovator,
and most of the limited law reform he undertook as a judge was
aimed not at advancing any substantive agenda, but rather at
making the law more objective and precise, and hence more predictable." His major project in constitutional law was to clear
away judicial barriers, against Progressive social and economic
legislation, even though he personally thought that most of the
Progressive program was bad public policy '
There are exceptions in Holmes's record to this pervasive judicial conservatism and deference, but though they are among his
most important opinions, they are few and far between. The
best-known are the two free speech dissents in which he pressed
the Court to go beyond the existing case law to limit legislative
power over subversive agitation.2 9 In a similar veto are two innovating opinions in favor of expanding federal habeas corpus
review of state criminal proceedings." Perhaps we should add
the two common-law dissents on behalf of labor's right to picket
that he wrote while still on the Massachusetts court in the
1890s,31 and his dissents from the established doctrine that
federal courts need not follow state common-law decisions in
some diversity cases. 2

27. Holmes's best-known effort m tis direction was his campaign to gradually
substitute specific safety rules for the general requirement of due care in negligence
cases. See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927); HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 97-103.
28. See infra note 63.
29. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925); Abrams v United States, 250
U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
30. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309
(1915).
31. Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (Mass. 1900); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44
N.E. 1077, 1079 (Mass. 1896). Arguably Holmes saw these opinions not as judicial
legislation, but rather as reqired by the politically neutral application of prior decisions involving business boycotts. See HOLMES, Privilege, supra note 10, at 127-30.
32. Black & White Tam Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532
(1928); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1910). Alternatively, these
opinions might simply be seen as following from Holmes's tendency to defer to law
already laid down, here, state law.
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But memorable as they are, these and the few others like
them represent less than a dozen out of more than two thousand
opinions. In general Holmes's decisions over nearly fifty years on
the bench followed existing law wherever he could find it,
whether in precedent or legislation. This aspect of his judicial
record has surprised many who believe that the famous pragmatist slogans naturally imply some form of judicial activism in the
service of reform. Some commentators have postulated that
Holmes found he could not sustain the reformist program implied by The Common Law once he was on the bench, and thereafter abandoned it for the Olympian and somewhat cymcal positivism of his later years. They see the young Holmes as a pragmatist theoretician of actively legislative adjudication who then,
upon exposure to the practicalities of judging or the complexities
of industrial society, was converted into a judicial formalist.'
The problem with this theory is that Holmes continued to
articulate his early pragmatist law-reforming views in his theoretical pronouncements of the late 1890s, after he had been a
judge for nearly twenty years. At the same time, he extolled the
virtues of judges' sticking to precedent and deferring to legislatures. He saw no inconsistency in the two positions.
For example, one of Holmes's best-known arguments for practical law reform involved what he called "survivals,"34 doctrines
whose original policy basis had disappeared, but which had sur-

33. For "two Holmes" theories, see MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 109-44 (1992); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE LNNER SELF 215-24,

253-55 (1993); Mark Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the
Supreme Judicial Court, 63 VA. L. REV. 975 (1977). These commentators see Holmes
as shifting from a mainly historicist (and pragmatist) jurist to a mainly positivist
one. Tushnet and White stress the influence of Holmes's experience of the relatively
petty daily work of judging in tis transformation, while Horwitz stresses an external factor, the rise of overt social conflict in the country between the early 1880s
and the late 1890s. See HORWITZ, supra, at 140-42; WHITE, supra, at 224; Tushnet,
supra, at 982-83. All three argue that Holmes came to disbelieve in the significance
of the kind of overall jurisprudential anatomy that he had pursued m The Common
Law, and came to see law as the result of a collection of relatively disconnected
disputes and power struggles-which the philosophical jurist could not much help
resolving. See HORWITz, supra, at 140-42; WHITE, supra, at 218-22; Tushnet, supra,
at 1046-48.
34. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 33.
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vived through inertia and been given new and unconvincing explanations.35 In The Common Law he said that identification of
a legal survival of this kind justified "scrutiny" to determine
whether the new reasons given for such doctrines "are satisfactory," and if they are not, he required "revision." '
When he came to write The Path of the Law, after fifteen
years on the bench, Holmes had not retreated from this View;
indeed he restated it much more vividly and forcefullyIt is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past."
At this point, he went on: "I am thinking of the technical rule as
to trespass ab initio, as it is called, which I attempted to explain
in a recent Massachusetts case."' He cited the case in a footnote, and the contemporary reader naturally infers that at least
this one irrational excrescence has been cleansed from the law of
Massachusetts. But if you look up the case, you will find that
Holmes, after showing the doctrine to be a "survival" of the
worst sort, then unhesitatingly applied it to affirm the
appellant's conviction for larceny 3 9 There are other instances of
the same phenonemon, ° and Holmes took the trouble to make
his general view explicit in his opinion for the court in another
case, illustrating that this was not something forced upon him
by his judicial brethren:
W]e are not at liberty to refuse to carry out to its conse-

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, supra note 4, at 187.
38. Id. (refernng to Commonwealth v Rubin, 43 N.E. 200 (Mass. 1896)).
39. Rubin, 43 N.E. at 200-01.
40. See Commonwealth v. Cleary, 51 N.E. 746 (Mass. 1898) (discussed m HOLMES,
Law in Science, supra note 11, at 227). This essay provides another stark juxitaposition of Holmes's coexisting beliefs in judicial legislation and strong adherence to precedent: "I do not expect or think it desirable that the judges should undertake to
renovate the law
Where there is doubt the simple tool of logic does not suffice, and even if it is disguised and unconscious, the judges are called on to exercise
the sovereign prerogative of choice." HOLMES, Law in Science, supra note 11, at 239.
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quences any principle which we believe to have been part of
the common law simply because the grounds of policy on
which it might be justified seem to us to be hard to find, and
4
probably to have belonged to a different state of society
In a speech to Massachusetts lawyers summing up his twenty
years on the bench, Holmes concisely stated his philosophy of
judging in words that are worth quoting at length:
I have tried to see the law as an organic whole. I have also
tried to see it as a reaction between tradition on the one side
and the changing desires and needs of a community on the
other. I have studied tradition in order that I might understand how it came to be what it is, and to estimate its worth
with regard to our present needs; and my references to the
Year Books often have had a skeptical end. I have considered
the present tendencies and desires of society and have tried
to realize that its different portions want different things,
and that my business was to express not my personal wish,
but the resultant, as nearly as I could guess, of the pressure
of the past and the conflicting wills of the present. I have
considered the social and economic postulates on which we
frame the conception of our needs, and I have to see them in
a dry light. It has seemed to me that certainty is an illusion,
that we have few scientific data on which to affirm that one
rule rather than another has the sanction of the universe,
that we rarely could be sure that one tends more distinctly
than its opposite to the survival and welfare of the society
where it is practiced, and that the wisest are but blind
guides.
But we have a great body of law which has at least this
sanction: that it exists. If one does not affirm that it is intrinsically better than a different body of principles which one
could imagine, one can see an advantage which, if not the
greatest, at least, is very great-that we know what it is. For
this reason I am slow to assent to overruling a decision. Precisely my skepticism, my doubt as to the absolute worth of a
large part of the system we administer, or of any other system, makes me very unwilling to increase the doubt as to
what the court will do. I have noticed the opposite tendency

41. Dempsey v Chambers, 28 N.E. 279, 280 (Mass. 1891).
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m minds that regarded our corpus juris as an image, however
faint, of the eternal law 42

Here we see the two elements of Holmes's philosophy clearly
juxtaposed: toward the beginnig, the pragmatic reformism of
the famous passages from The Common Law, focused on obsolete "survivals," and expressed in much the same terms Holmes
had used twenty years before; and then the skeptical conservatism, the dogged msistence on adherence to whatever rules
might be in place.
The latter was not a new element. Holmes had written to the
same effect as a young lawyer in 1873. 43 And in The Common
Law, when Holmes spoke of the reconsideration and "revision" of
legal survivals, the agents for making the change were not judges, but "we"--wbich we may take as a reference to legislative
law reform inspired by juristic experts.44 The only kind of judicial legislation Holmes did explicitly endorse in The Common
Law was the minimal sort that occurs when judges establish
rules by drawing relatively arbitrary lines in the penumbral
areas of vague legal concepts so that the law might be clearer

and more predictable.45

42. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Twenty Years in Retrospect, in THE OCCASIONAL
SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 154, 155-57 (Mark D. Howe ed.,
1962) [hereinafter HOLMES, Twenty Years].
43. Reviewing a new journal dedicated to the 'emancipation of our courts from
their present undue adherence to precedent," he expressed the hope "that the editors
will fail in their expressed desire to diminish the weight of precedents with our
courts. We believe the weight attached to them is about the best thing in our whole
system of law." I OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Summary of Events, in THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF JUSTICE HOL1MFS 322, 323 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS] (originally appeanng at 7 AM. L. REV. 558, 579 (1873)).
44. When we find that in large and important branches of the law the various grounds of policy on which the various rules have been justified are
later inventions to account for what are in fact survivals from more
primitive times, we have a right to reconsider the popular reasons, and,
taking a broader view of the field, to decide anew whether those reasons
are satisfactory.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 33.
45. Where Holmes says that it would be 'useful" to "insist on a conscious recogmtion of the legislative function of the courts," td. at 32, he drops a footnote referring
ahead to his discussion of the line-drawing judicial function in negligence cases, see
id. at 97-103. On Holmes's minimalist approach to penumbral line-drawing by judges, see infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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So the apparent paradox of Holmes's legal reformism juxtaposed to rigid judicial adherence to precedent cannot be explained as a change m his position. I think the key to understanding this puzzle is the very strong but often neglected and
generally misunderstood distinction he made between the roles
of judge and legislator The orthodox formalist of course makes a
firn theoretical distinction between legislation and adjudication.
The essence of the legislator's function is to make law, while the
essence of the judge's function is to discover and apply it. To the
formalist, even the common-law judge, though operating without
legislative gidance, discovers the legal principles immanent in
the decided cases, and bases the rules for deciding new cases on
deduction from those principles.
Holmes held no such view; indeed he is chiefly famous in legal
thought for his critique of this orthodox view of the judicial process. As a jurisprudential pragmatist he thought judges must
draw upon "legislative" considerations when they exercised what
he called their "sovereign prerogative of choice."46 Given that
view, you might think he would downplay the distinction between judge and legislator in practice. But recall that he was a
very unusual pragmatist-a "militant skeptic" and only a "tame
utilitarian." He did think that the aim of the law generally
should be to advance the public welfare. And as we have seen,
he had definite convictions on many issues of social policy Yet
his formative experience on how strong convictions were
transmuted into public policy was the Civil War, and forever
after the former soldier had little confidence in the power of
evidence or rational argument to resolve disagreement. Human
beings of good will would disagree and would have to fight it
out--either on an actual battlefield or, better, through some
agreed upon substitute for war, like majority vote. What was
needed was not evidence or argument, which rarely convinced
anyone, but some peaceful way of determining the preponderant
or dominant sentiment of the community
When judges make law, he thought that they should do so on
behalf of the community, not on the basis of personal views of
public policy that they know half their fellow citizens think
46. HOLMES, Law in Science, supra note 11, at 239.
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wrong. Marked as he was by his war experience, Holmes was
vividly aware of the community not as an organism but as a
field of battle--"its different portions want different things,"4
as he said. Skeptic that he was, he "rarely could be sure that
one [rule] tends more distinctly than its opposite to the survival
and welfare of the society where it is practiced."4 8 All that could
be tested objectively was the weight of current preference, and
the legislature was the only institution reasonably designed to
register that. In the absence of legislation, the existing body of
49
law had the virtue "that it exists" and "we know what it is.",
His respect for precedent derived from his "doubt as to the absolute worth of a large part of the system we administer, or of any
other system."0 "[A]lmost the only thing that can be assumed
as certainly to be wished is that men should know the rules by
which the game will be played."'1
Holmes best expressed his view on the relation of judge to
legislator in a familiar sentence from his dissent in Southern
Pacific v. Jensen: "I recognize without hesitation that judges do
and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they
are confined from molar to molecular motions." 2 Here Holmes
used a metaphor already familiar in his day- the rules of the
legal system dictate the decision in most cases, but those rules
leave some gaps, and when (but only when) a case falls in one of
those gaps the judge must legislate.
When Holmes adopted the gap metaphor, he of course rejected
the classical or purely declaratory theory of the judicial function;
the existence of gaps meant that judges could not decide all

47. HOLMES, Twenty Years, supra note 42, at 156.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. HOLMES, Holdsworth's, supra note 19, at 289.
52. 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf. RANDOM HOUSE
WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 872 (1991) (defining molar as "pertaining to a body
of matter as a whole, as contrasted with molecular and atonuc"). This statement
makes a macabre reference back to an opinon Holmes had written as a state judge,
rejecting a constitutional challenge to the replacement of hanging by electrocution as
the method of execution: "The suggestion that the pumshment of death, m order not
to be unusual, must be accompamed by molar rather than molecular motion seems
to us a fancy unwarranted by the constitution." In re Storti, 60 N.E. 210, 211 (Mass.
1901).
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cases simply by applying established law But that does not tell
us how deferential or activist he thought judges should be. That
depended on his view of the number and size of the gaps compared to the area covered by the rules. And that in turn depends
on the extent to which Holmes anticipatorily adopted the later
Legal Realist stance of rule skepticism.
Here is another major source of the general misunderstanding
of Holmes's judicial philosophy Holmes was a skeptic generally,
so it is natural to assume that he must have been a rule skeptic,
like the later Legal Realists or today's Critical Schools. As such,
he should have believed that the gaps left by the system of legal
rules were large, perhaps even all-encompassing, so that all
judicial decisions were legislative-or "political," as the current
discourse puts it. After all, the Realists (like Jerome Frank) who
took Holmes as their model were rule skeptics.5 3 And their
skepticism drew heavily on Holmes's well-known theory that
legal concepts typically have a core-penumbra structure, and so
apply as a matter of degree rather than all-or-nothing.
Holmes certainly thought that legal concepts were generally
fuzzy rather than clearly bounded, and this view was tied to his
well-known insistence, which appears again and again in his
opinions and other writings, that many legal disputes turned on
questions of degree. He thought most legal concepts had
paradigmatic instances, to which they uncontroversially applied,
but then applied less and less clearly to cases that diverged increasingly from the prototype.54 This formulation stemmed from
Holmes's instrumental pragmatism. Legal rules gamed their
point from their alms, but the purpose or policy behind a rule
applied not in an all-or-nothing way, but along a continuum,
more or less.

53. For the apotheosis of Holmes as the Legal Realist model, "the completely
adult Jurist," see JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 270-77 (Peter Smith
ed., Anchor Books 1970) (1930).
54. See 1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Theory of Torts, in COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 43, at 326, 328 (originally appearing at 7 AM. L. REV 652 (1873)).
Holmes repeated his observations from The Theory of Torts when he summarized the
point in The Common Law: "Legal, like natural divisions, however clear m their
general outline, will be found on exact scrutiny to end in a penumbra or debatable
land." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 101.
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On this theory, the difficult cases that actually came to litigation typically arose m the overlapping penumbras of competing
legal concepts. This theory sounded like a form of rule skepticism, and, indeed, in a certain sense it was. But-and this is the
crucial point-the kind of rule skepticism involved did not enhance the scope of the legislative role for the Holmesian judge.
Consider the implications of Holmes's dominant metaphor, "interstitial legislation." In saying that judges legislate "interstitially," rather than simply "in the gaps," Holmes was already suggesting that he thought of the gaps as small. The Oxford English Dictionary defines an interstice as "[an intervening space
(usually, empty); [especially] a relatively small or narrow space,
the minute space[s]
between things or the parts of a body
55
matter."
of
parts
ultimate
between the
In Holmes's metaphor, then, law was a largely solid structure
irregularly punctuated by mterstices--"small, narrow, minute"
gaps. Compare this to another form of gapped structure, a net,
which might represent the relation of rule to discretion for
Jerome Frank or for the contemporary Critic. In a net, the open
spaces are large in comparison to the solid structure, and they
perform the important function of letting the fluid or small particles pass through. No one would call the gaps in a net "interstices." Interstices are there by default, the results of an imperfect fit between structural components. Holmes further reinforced the impression of a solid structure with minor gaps by
calling the judicial motions that the interstices permit "molecular," and contrasting them with the "molar" motion of real legislation. Molecules are after all very small in comparison to the
gross physical objects suggested by the term "molar." Nor were
the gaps in Holmes's picture of the law truly empty space, inviting or requiring pure judicial invention. Rather, when we add
Holmes's metaphor of core and penumbra to the metaphor of
structure and interstices, we picture the gaps as already occupied by the overlapping penumbral policies that radiate out from
the adjoining concepts or rules.
An interstitial case, then, required the judge to identify the
competing policies that underlay the adjoinng legal rules, and

55. 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1140 (2d ed. 1989).
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then pick between them. Neither of the competing policies were
likely to be centrally implicated-the case was interstitial and
penumbral precisely because it lay at some distance from the
core applications of the competing rules or concepts. And even if
the policies were both strongly applicable, Holmes did not believe there was any rational metric for balancing one against the
other. For him, competing policies represented a split in the
community, whose different portions "want different things," 6
and, in the absence of a legislative resolution based on counting
heads or registering the dominance of one group over another,
these conflicting wants were incommensurable.
To Holmes, the judge's concern in such a situation was not
mainly with the substantive policies behind the competing doctrines but with considerations of present and future peace and
stability First, the case should be authoritatively resolved. Second, the resolution should allow ready prediction of how similar
future disputes would be resolved-thus closing the legal gap.
The judge's sovereign prerogative of choice in such cases thus
came down to articulating which marginally implicated policy
should take precedence in the interest of present peace and future predictability
This view of judicial legislation helps explain the style of
many of Holmes's opinions in cases he regarded as interstitial.
He would very briefly state what he thought were the policies or
social interests that conflicted in the case and then would simply
announce which one had prevailed.57 This procedure followed
from his theory A judge who thinks there is nothing at stake
beyond reaching a decision in the case at hand and specifying a
precedent for very similar cases in the future will not agonize
over explaining why the decision came out the way it did.
Holmes might have used his core-penumbra view of legal concepts expansively, increasing the area of judicial discretion by
showing that legal doctrines conventionally viewed as firm were
actually permeable. This approach-softening up "existing law"
preparatory to changing it-was pioneered by Cardozo5 8 and
56. HOLMES, Twenty Years, supra note 42, at 156.
57. See, e.g., Boston Ferrule Co. v. Hills, 34 N.E. 85, 86-87 (Mass. 1893);
Middlesex County v McCue, 21 N.E. 230, 231 (Mass. 1889).
58. See MacPherson v Buick Motor Co., Iii N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (softening
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has.become standard in post-1940 realist-style judicial activism.
With his reiterated insistence on the pervasiveness of matters of
degree in the law, Holmes laid the conceptual groundwork for
the technique.
But the fact is that he hardly ever practiced it. For the pragmatist Holmes, there was no simple "fact of the matter" on the
question of how firm or how flexible legal rules and doctrines
were. This was a matter for decision by the judge, who should be
guided by the relevant policies m light of the prevailing traditions. And for Holmes, the dominant policies guiding the judge
were not any substantive agenda, which would involve illegitimately taking sides within a divided community Rather, they
included deference to politically sovereign authorities on the one
hand and predictability on the other. Both of these policies
would be undermined if judges regularly used sophisticated
arguments to evade the force of rules that were conventionally
thought firm enough to favor one side of a dispute. And we find
Holmes quite consistently interpreting statutes and past decisions to give them broad scope and hence to make the gaps left
by established law relatively small.59
In one important class of cases, Holmes was less respectful
of precedent, and did exercise his logical and rhetorical powers
to show that well-established doctrines could be dragged from
the solid core into the debatable penumbra for judicial scrutiny
fatally the distinction between exceptional inherently dangerous products, as to
which the manufacturer owed a general duty of due care, and ordinary products that
would be foreseeably dangerous if defectively manufactured, as to which the duty extended only to the those in privity with the defendant).
59. Holmes's approach to statutory interpretation is a large subject, whose details
must be left for another occasion. 'Characteristically, he provided much-quoted slogans to both sides of the traditional dispute between using legislative intent or plain
meaning as the primary guide. Compare Johnson v United States, 163 F 30, 32
(ist Cir. 1908) with OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 4, at 203, 207 (originally appearing at 12
HARv. L. REV. 417 (1899)); see also Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in
Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1126-28
(1992) (noting that Holmes is the most cited authority on methods of statutory interpretation, supplying language for both sides). For further illustrations of Holmes's
approaches, see Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928);
International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 52 (1926); Panama R.R. v.
Rock, 266 U.S. 209, 215 (1924); Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,
400 (1904).
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and revision. These were his opinions rejecting constitutional
challenges to legislation, challenges that in his day mainly involved claims that Progressive reform statutes took property
without compensation, infrnged on the liberty of contract, or
exceeded enumerated federal powers." In these cases, Holmes
undermined the apparent solidity of constitutional limitations
often relatively well-established in the case law It was mostly
these opinions that gave Holmes the reputation of being a creative judge and a Great Dissenter But, while rule skepticism
may have undermined the virtue of predictability based upon
adherence to precedent in these cases, it served the other policy
that dominates Holmes's judicial philosophy-the policy of deference to the dominant forces in the community, most authoritatively represented by the legislature.
In his Lochner dissent, Holmes wrote of the "right of a majority to embody their decisions in law,""' and there was no other
right to which he was so committed as a judge. In The Common
Law, when he praised Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts as the greatest American judge, he spoke of Shaw's "accurate appreciation of the requirements of the commiumty whose
officer he was." 2 Holmes believed profoundly in being a good
officer of his community-while having little sympathy with the
sentiments of the majority of his day 63
Nor did he conceive of his officership in aristocratic terms.
That is, he had no notion that his function was to lead the people to measures more enlightened than they could formulate for
themselves. It was not to the majority's happiness that he was
committed, but to their actual policy choices. "Here lies the supple tool of power"--so he joked should be the inscription on

60. See, e.g., Truax v Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(noting "[t]he dangers of a delusive exactness m the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
61. Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
62. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 85.
63. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Sept. 12,
1916), n 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 15, at 19; Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), in id. at 21; Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Jan. 8, 1917), in id. at 51-52; Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Aug. 6, 1917), in id. at 96.
64. MERLO J. PUSEY, 1 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 287 (Columbia Umv Press 1963)
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his tombstone. But he was not joking when in The Common Law
he wrote that "[t]he first requirement of a sound body of law is,
that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands
of the community, whether r4ght or wrong."'
Like the stress on predictability that made him so'reluctant to
depart from judicial precedent, Holmes's deference to dominant
opinion is best understood as the position of a "tame utilitarian"
who is at the same time a "militant skeptic." He did not thank
anyone could come close to proving which of the contending social ideas of his tine would advance human welfare in the long
run. Therefore it was by default that the law settled for "the de
facto will of the community for the tine."6 Though he thought
"It]hereis every reason
for trying to make our desires mtelligent "I 7 he despaired of any immediate prospects of that, and
was willing to settle for shaping public policy according to "our
desires" of the moment, unintelligent as he suspected many of
them were.6" In Holmes's martial view of the world, when people did not get what they wanted, they fought for it. The dominant power would win the fight and get what it wanted eventually That's what it means to be dominant: for Holmes as for
Hobbes, clubs were trumps. So giving in at once spared the casualties, which were definite and avoidable disutilities.
Holmes's strong belief in judicial deference to the sovereign
community and its formal institutions may also have had some

(1951).
65. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 36 (emphasis added). Holmes's
view on this subject did not change. In 1900, he wrote:
What proximate test of excellence can be found except correspondence to
the actual equilibrium of force in the community-that is, conformity to
the wishes of the dominant power? Of course, such conformity may lead
to destruction, and it is desirable that the dominant power should be
wise. But wise or not, the proximate test of a good government is that
the dominant power has its way.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Montesquweu, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 4,
at 258.
66. HOLMES, Holdsworth's, supra note 19, at 288.
67. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Ideals and Doubts, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS,
supra note 4, at 303, 305 (originally appearing at 10 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1915)).
68. Id. Holmes showed no trace of public-choice style skepticism; he evidently did
not doubt that democratic legislation was the best index of the actual balance of
preference in the community.
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basis, perhaps only partly conscious, m his sense of his own
limitations. Product as he was of the preindustrial New England
intellectual and social aristocracy, he was hardly a man of his
time. He described himself as "academic to the point of unreality";6 9 he did not "read the papers or otherwise feel the pulse of
the machine";' ° he "never [knew] any facts about anything" and
was "baffled" whenever a visitor asked "some informal intelligent question about our institutions or the state of politics or
anything else."
Perhaps he would have been less deferential as a judge had
he sensed in himself more of the capacity he ascribed to Shaw
for "accurate appreciation of the requirements of the community
whose officer he was.""2 Shaw had been, after all, a great common-law activist, an energetic judicial legislator. Holmes also
praised Ins friend and colleague, U.S. Chief Justice Edward
Douglass White, for "always thinking what will be the practical
effect of the decision (which of course is the ultimate justification or condemnation of the principle adopted)." 3 He added revealingly, "I think of [the decision's] relation to the theory and
philosophy of the law
[W]e sometimes come together head
4
on with a whack." Holmes may have so assiduously avoided
the kind of judicial law reform his best-known jurisprudential
slogans have been thought to justify, in part simply because he
sensed that he had little aptitude for it. 5
After he had consulted the policies of making the law maxi-

69. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lady Pollock (Jan. 10, 1904), zn I
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 15, at 116.
70. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Fredrick Pollock (May 25, 1906), zn 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 15, at 124.
71. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Fredrick Pollock & Lady Pollock (Sept.
24, 1904), zn 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 15, at 118. For more on
Holmes's deference and its connection to his patriotism and his attitude toward democracy, see Thomas C. Grey, Holmes, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 71 OR. L. REv
521, 536-38 (1992).
72. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 85.
73. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Patrick A. Sheehan (Jan. 31, 1913), in
HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE 58 (David H. Burton ed., 1976).
74. Id.
75. Note Judge Posner's interesting comparison of Holmes and Shaw as judicial
policy analysts, which much favors Shaw. POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 25154. "Holmes believed in policy analysis but lacked the patience to do it." Id. at 252.
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mally predictable and deferring to legislative judgment, Holmes
generally found only very small interstices within which the
judicial legislator could work. In all but the reasons he gave for
what he did, he acted like a formalist, not like a pragmatist,
judge. But the reasons that he gave mattered and have come to
matter more with the passing years. How they mattered surfaced in those opinions, rare but memorable, in which Holmes
persuaded himself that the law left a substantial gap unfilled by
precedent or legislation. What is remarkable about these opinions is the uniquely candid way in which he took off the hat of
rule applier and put on that of legislator. I will give only two
examples-there were not very many in all, but they tend to be
among his best-known opinions.
First is his dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner7 The issue was
whether workers should be enjoined from peacefully picketing
an employer with whom they had a labor dispute.77 They obviously intended to inflict economic loss through the picketing,
and Holmes treated the question of whether their goals justified
this harm as an open question of public policy, stating that
"It]he true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of
social advantage."' At common law, businesses had been allowed to enforce cartel arrangements by boycott, and in
Holmes's view concerted action by labor should be allowed the
same freedom.79 "[T]he organization of the world, now going on
so fast, means an ever-increasing might and scope of combination.""0 The injunction should therefore be denied.81
The other and even more striking example is his dissent in
2 The issue was whether wiretap
Olmstead v. United States."
evidence obtained in violation of state law could be admitted in
a federal prosecution.' Brandeis dissented, arguing that wiretapping fell under what Holmes called "the penumbra of the

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

44 NE. 1077, 1079 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1081.
Id.
Id. at 1081-82.
277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 455.
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Fourth and Fifth Amendment." 4 Holmes dissented on
nonconstitutional grounds, under what we now call the supervisory power. "I think
that apart from the Constitution the
government ought not to use evidence obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act. There is no body of precedents by which
we are bound and which confines us to logical deduction from
established rules."85 Here he signaled that the case fell in a
legal interstice. Note what he made of it:
Therefore we must consider the two objects of desire, both of
which we cannot have
It is desirable that crimmals
should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence should be used. It is also desirable that the Government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when
they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained.
We have to choose, and for my part I think it a
less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
Government should play an ignoble part.8"
The "for my part" makes more explicit than is customary among
judges the exercise of the sovereign prerogative of choice.
There is something refreshing about this style of opinion writing in the close case, and it is not simply a stylistic point but
has implications for legal theory On Holmes's model of adjudication, the judge does two different things in deciding cases: follows the rules where there are rules to follow, and where there
are not, legislates a new rule for the case and for the future.
H.L.A. Hart elaborated a more nuanced version of this dual view
of the judicial process in his jurisprudential classic, The Concept
of Law 87 Critics of this positivist model of judicial deci84.
85.
86.
87

Id.
Id.
Id.
The

at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); zd. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
at 469-70 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
at 470.
open texture of law means that there are, indeed, areas of conduct

where much must be left to be developed by courts or officials strikmg a
balance, m the light of circumstances, between competing interests which
vary in weight from case to case. None the less, the life of the law consists to a very large extent in the guidance both of officials and private
individuals by determinate rules which, unlike the applications of vanable standards, do not require from them a fresh judgment from case to
case.
H.L.A. HAir, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 135 (2d ed. 1994).
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sion-Ronald Dworkin has been one of the most emment-have
noted that judges and lawyers do not generally write or speak in
terms consistent with it when actually arguing and deciding
cases. Rather the language of advocacy and justification seems
the same in all cases, suggesting an attempt to reach the "right"
(or best) answer for the case by considering all the analogies,
and when considerations of fit or consistency do not determine
things, to reach the decision that makes the overall law the best
it can be while maintaining the commitment to overall legal
"integrity," as Dworkin calls it."8
Holmes, in opinions like those in Vegelahn and Olmstead,
supplies a strong counterexample to Dworkin's point. He openly
practiced the "interstitial legislator" view of judging, and used
the language the view implied. That is to say, he sharply distmguished between the judicial activities of rule finding and rule
applying, on the one hand, and forward-looking decisionmaking
according to considerations of social policy on the other. Later
activist judges have provided many more and more extensive
examples of frank judicial legislation than Holmes ever did. 9 I
think particularly of those cases in which courts announce that
they are creating a new rule and therefore will make its application prospective only 90 But contemporary judicial pragmatists
tend not to sharply distingush legislative from rule-driven decisions; rather they treat cases as lying along a spectrum from

88. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 151-75 (1986) (contrasting "pragmatism,"
which for Dworkin includes any instrumentalist account of law, with "law as integrity," which treats the prncipled coherence of the law as an independent value). Despite his instrumentalism, Holmes continued to place some emphasis on the overall
coherence of law, Dworkn's "integrity." See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note
2, at 5 ("It is something to show that the consistency of a system requires a particular result, but it is not all."). I believe he did this on instrumental grounds, assuming that, other things being equal, when a body of law was more systematic-more
like a body than a heap-its provisions were easier to identify and to understand.
For a discussion with reference to sources, see Grey, supra note 7, at 822-23.
89. For the prototype of the modern legislative style in groundbreaking commonlaw decisions, see Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) (basmg proposed change in common law on a frank discussion of policy grounds).
90. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1244 (Cal. 1975); see CARDOZO,
supra note 5, at 146-49 (giving an early endorsement of the prospective overruling
device).
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relatively easy to relatively hard, blending policy discussion with
considerations of stability and doctrinal consistency in varying
proportions.
For Holmes, by contrast, a case was either covered by an
applicable rule or it fell in a gap. If there was a rule, however
dubious or obsolete its justification, it governed, as with the
Rubzn case and the obsolete doctrine of trespass ab
initzio--because it was there to be relied on. On the other
hand, when the rules ran out, it was the judge's job to legislate.
Equally important, the judge was to make it clear this was being
done, describing the competing policies and stating the choice
between them. This was not primarily to justify the decision; to
Holmes a decision the other way would typically be nearly as
good in substantive terms. Rather the policy ground was given
so that lawyers could better construe the rule laid down, and
predict outcomes to clients.9" And the statement of rationale
would allow future legislators to identify the rule as ripe for revision when the grounds given no longer applied.
Such judicial legislation was in general appropriate, on
Holmes's theory, only when it did not much matter which way
the judge decided. The judicial task was to enforce the rules that
the dominant forces in the community had laid down or had left
undisturbed, and otherwise to help keep the peace by settling
disputes with an eye to preventing future ones. As I have mentioned, Holmes once proposed, only half in jest, that on his
tombstone should be inscribed the words: "Here lies the supple
tool of power." 3 If you could bring him back, you might ask
him why he would sum himself up that way After all, contrary
to the implication of those self-deprecating words, he was an unusually independent-minded person with many very strong
views that ran contrary to the common wisdom of his day Why
would he bend himself so accommodatingly to the beliefs and
desires of the many?

91. Commonwealth v. Rubin, 43 N.E. 200 (Mass. 1896).
92. Sometimes, in the interest of predictability, the judge would sublegislate a rule

significantly broader than the case at hand. An example is Holmes's project of supplementing the standard of due care in negligence cases with specific judge-made
safety rules. See supra note 27.
93. See supra note 64.
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He might first respond to your question with one of his celebrated passages of high rhetoric:
[Wlhen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself
94
accepted in the competition of the market
But finally he would have to modulate into an ironic key In his
view, this best test was still not a very good one, for "truth [has
What we most love and revere generally is
its] root in tune
And this again means
determined by early associations.
[Y]ou cannot argue a man into liking a glass of
scepticism
,as
beer
Holmes never meant to state an inspmng judicial philosophy
He thought of the judiciary, quite traditionally, as the reasoning
branch of government, and yet was skeptical of the power of
reason to change people's minds. He did not consider it his job
as a judge either to make the world conform more closely to a
vision of the good or a theory of justice, or to respond with sympathy to the human equities of the individual case. The
Holmesian judge is an austere minnalist, there to see first of
all that the serious game is played by the rules; secondly, where
there is no rule, to devise a new one sufficient at least to decide
the instant case; and finally, to keep the distinction between
these modes of decision altogether clear.

94. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
95. HOLMES, Natural Law, supra note 24, at 311-12.

